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CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
John S. Baker, Jr. *
PRE-TRIAL ACQUITTAL
In State v. Mims,' the judge in a non-jury trial rendered a pre-trial
verdict of not guilty after the assistant district attorney refused to commence
trial. Earlier the prosecutor had assured the trial judge of his readiness for
trial. By the time the court was ready to commence, the prosecutor found
that two crucial state witnesses were missing. Though the assistant district
attorney informed the court that he would be unable to proceed, the judge
ordered him to begin his case. Following a temporary standoff, the state
requested a brief recess; the court denied the request and adjudged the
defendant not guilty. The supreme court reversed, finding that normally "to
render a verdict of not guilty at any time prior to the close of the State's
evidence is to act prematurely and therefore arbitrarily,''2 and indicating
that under article 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "[t]he court could
have: ordered a continuance on its own motion; cited the recalcitrant
assistant district attorney for contempt; or dismissed the prosecution with-
out prejudice." 3
This decision is in accord with other provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Under article 386, a trial judge's discharge of a defendant after a
preliminary hearing does not preclude the state from prosecuting the
defendant on the same charge. If a judge's finding of no probable cause after
a preliminary hearing does not operate as an acquittal, certainly a dismissal
prior to the presentation of any evidence ought not to do so. The possible
remedies suggested by the supreme court--continuance, contempt, and
dismissal without prejudice-would prevent the trial court from having "to
hold its business in abeyance on the chance that the missing witnesses would
appear. . . ."' These remedies, however, would not in any way alter the
state's basic control over the trial docket under article 702.1
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 329 So. 2d 686 (La. 1976).
2. Id. at 688.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 702, comment (a) provides in part: "This article
preserves the basic right of the state to control the prosecution. .. ."
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THE JURY
Swearing and Sequestration
In State v. Smith, 6 a juror who had been selected, sworn, and
sequestered in a capital case temporarily separated himself from the other
jurors. The juror had gone to his home a few blocks away, but quickly was
missed and returned to the courthouse. The supreme court affirmed the
conviction despite the presumption of reversible error that arises from the
separation of a juror in capital cases.7 The court held that the presumption
could be, and in this case was, rebutted "where circumstances are such as to
reasonably overcome the presumption of prejudice and where it affirmative-
ly appears that no prejudice to the accused can have resulted. ... 8
State v. Martin9 put to rest, however, any thought that Smith meant to
make the presumption of reversible error a generally rebuttable one. In
Martin, the trial court permitted a capital jury, which had been selected but
not sworn, to separate overnight. The supreme court refused to "extend
[the] ruling [of Smith] to this case where the entire jury was separated for
twenty-one hours." 0 The court implied that rebuttal of the presumption of
prejudice is limited to purely technical or temporary violations of the
sequestration rule.
Martin also discussed the fact that the trial judge allowed the jury to
separate because they had not yet been sworn. Article 791 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides for the sequestration of capital jurors after they
are sworn, but does not specify when they are to be sworn. Article 788,
however, clearly provides that jurors are to be sworn immediately after
selection. Accordingly the fact that the jurors were not sworn "does not
alter the result. . . [but] only compounds the error."l" Reversal resulted
from a "combination of these two factors."
OPENING STATEMENTS
Conspiracy
The law of conspiracy has not played the prominent role in Louisiana
criminal trials that it has in the federal courts. As a result of three recent
6. 322 So. 2d 197 (La. 1975).
7. See State v. Luquette, 275 So. 2d 396 (La. 1973); State v. Craighead, 114 La.
84, 38 So. 28 (1905).
8. 322 So. 2d at 201.
9. 329 So. 2d 688 (La. 1976).
10. Id. at 691.
11. Id.
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cases, 2 however, it can be expected that the law of conspiracy will be
employed more frequently at various stages of criminal trials in Louisiana.' 
3
State v. Brown 4 and State v. Kaufman' 5 permit the prosecutor to refer
to the law of conspiracy during his opening statement to the jury even
though a conspiracy has not been charged. The state may do so "whenever
more than one person is charged with the commission of a crime and the
State intends to prove a conspiracy in order to take advantage of La. R.S.
15:455. 16 which provides for the admission of acts and declarations of
one co-conspirator against another.' 7 The dangers, however, of referring
routinely to the law of conspiracy in the opening statement of a multiple-
defendant trial are mentioned by Justice Tate, concurring in Kaufman.
[P]rosecutors may well avoid the practice of instructing the jury as
to the law of conspiracy in their opening statements in every case where
the offense was committed by more than one person, for, if during the
trial there is no prima facie showing of a conspiracy, the prejudicial
impact of the earlier reference may necessitate a mistrial (or a reversal
of a subsequent conviction).'"
Caution, therefore, is advised because, as State v. Carter'9 holds,
proof of a prima facie case of conspiracy does not follow automatically from
the fact that two or more committed the crime.
We hold that when the only showing of a conspiracy is that two
people committed a crime, and there is no showing that defendant
either committed or conspired to commit the criminal act, no prima
facie case of conspiracy has been established. We further hold that the
12. State v. Kaufman, 331 So. 2d 16 (La. 1976); State v. Carter, 326 So. 2d 848
(La. 1975); State v. Brown, 326 So. 2d 839 (La. 1975).
13. In addition to opening statements, mention of the law of conspiracy may be
appropriate under certain circumstances during 1) voir dire, see State v. Brown, 326
So. 2d 839, 843 (La. 1975); but see id. at 845 (La. 1975) (Tate, J., concurring); 2)
closing argument; and 3) jury charge, compare State v. Brown, 326 So. 2d 839 (La.
1975) with State v. Carter, 326 So. 2d 848 (La. 1975).
14. 326 So. 2d 839 (La. 1975).
15. 331 So. 2d 16 (La. 1976).
16. 326 So. 2d at 843.
17. LA. R.S. 15:455 (1950): "Each coconspirator is deemed to assent to or to
commend whatever is said or done in furtherance of the common enterprise, and it is
therefore of no moment that such act was done or such declaration was made out of
the presence of the conspirator sought to be bound thereby, or whether the con-
spirator doing such act or making such declaration be or be not on trial with his
codefendant. But to have this effect a prima facie case of conspiracy must have been
established."
18. 331 So. 2d at 27.
19. 326 So. 2d 848 (La. 1975).
[Vol. 37
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fact, alone, that two or more have committed the crime charged is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy. 20
WITNESSES
Claiming the Privilege
In State v. Berry2 1 and State v. Duhon22 the supreme court clearly
adopted as its own the position of the American Bar Association Standards 23
that it is improper for either the prosecutor or the defense counsel to call a
witness before the jury if he knows that the witness will claim his privilege
against self-incrimination. Berry affirmed the refusal of the trial court to
require that a severed co-defendant claim his privilege before the jury. In
Duhon the court ordered a new trial because the prosecution called a severed
co-defendant to the stand, causing him to claim his privilege in response to
questions relating to the offense for which both he and the defendant were
charged.
Use of the Defendant's Testimony
In State v. Reed,24 the defendant attempted to limit the use that could
be made of testimony given by him at an earlier trial. After reversal of his
original conviction, the prosecution introduced, as part of its own case in the
second trial, a transcript of testimony the defendant had given at the original
trial. The defendant unsuccessfully urged the constitutional contentions that
the transcript violated his privilege against self-incrimination and that, as
part of the illegal original trial, it constituted "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The defendant also urged unsuccessfully that article 857 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 25 precluded introduction of the transcript. The court
rejected a reading of the article in light of the literal language of the official
revision comment that "the slate is wiped clean when a new trial is
granted. -26 The distinction was made that "merely tactical prejudice" to
the defendant is not barred. Accordingly article 857 did not bar the
introduction of the defendant's prior testimony "so long as the state does not
20. Id. at 854.
21. 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975).
22. 332 So. 2d 245 (La. 1976).
23. ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 5.7(c) (1971) and DEFENSE
FUNCTION, § 7.6(c) (1971).
24. 324 So. 2d 373 (La. 1975).
25. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 857: "The effect of granting a new trial is to set aside
the verdict or judgment and to permit retrial of the case with as little prejudice to
either party as if it had never been tried."
26. Id., comment (a).
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make it apparent to the jury that the testimony was from a prior trial.' '27 The
court's construction "of article 857 [was] not readily apparent from a
reading of its language of the jurisprudence interpreting it. "28 In reaching
the result, however, the court correctly was guided by the principle that
[the law must presume that people under oath speak the truth, and
we cannot conclude that the law requires us to determine that defend-
ant's prior, presumably truthful, statement could 'prejudice' him
later. 29
MISTRIAL
Reference to Other Crimes
State v. Roberts3" held that an improper question regarding the
defendant's juvenile adjudication of delinquency did not require a manda-
tory mistrial under article 770 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. During
cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor "asked him if in 1970 he
had pleaded guilty in juvenile court to theft and shoplifting. "31 An objection
was sustained, but a mistrial was denied. The supreme court affirmed,
reasoning that inasmuch as a juvenile adjudication does not constitute a
'crime" the prosecutor had not referred to inadmissible evidence of another
crime. The prosecutor's reference to the juvenile offense was deemed to fall
within article 771 that permits a mistrial only if "an admonition is not
sufficient to assure the defendant a fair trial."
The court's narrow construction'of article 770 may be attributable to
the absence of actual prejudice in this particular case, for the prosecutor also
had produced evidence of two non-juvenile convictions for purposes of
impeachment. The court concluded that any "additional prejudice" from
the improper question had been cured by the court's admonition. Had the
juvenile adjudication been construed to be a "crime" under article 770,
however, the court could not have avoided a reversal of the conviction by
applying the harmless error rule of article 921.32
The writer suggests that this case should be limited to its facts. For the
future, a distinguishing factor may be that in this case the prosecutor made
27. 324 So. 2d at 381.
28. Id. at 380.
29. Id. at 381.
30. 331 So. 2d II (La. 1976).
31. Id. at 13.
32. See State v. Green, 315 So. 2d 763, 765 (La. 1975).
[Vol. 37
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reference to an actual adjudication of juvenile delinquency. While not a
conviction, a decree of juvenile delinquency is a determination of wrong-
doing as opposed to a mere allegation of such.33 But for the defendant's age
at the time of commission, the offense would have been a crime and a proper
basis for impeaching him. Thus the result in this case should not extend to a
reference to a juvenile offense charge which has not resulted in an
adjudication of delinquency.
In State v. Price34 mere mention of the term "mug shot" almost
resulted in the reversal of a conviction. The court's original opinion did
reverse the conviction on the basis that mere use of that term is to be
construed as an indirect reference to other crimes "when it is used in
circumstances which suggest that the photograph was made before the
commission of the offense for which the defendant is on trial." '35 On
rehearing, however, the court reinstated the conviction stating that,
"[w]hile the use of the word 'mugshot,' in circumstances different from
those presented here, might violate the terms of article 770(2) we are
convinced that its use in the instant case did not constitute such a
violation. "36
The following circumstances were found to negate any improper
inference. During trial on a single charge of armed robbery evidence of
other armed robberies had been admitted. This evidence, approved by the
supreme court for the purpose of showing a "system," included identifica-
tion testimony by the victims of other armed robberies. While questioning
one of these other victims about his pre-trial identification of the defendant,
the prosecutor twice referred to "mug shots." The court concluded,
however, that the jury could have drawn only two "reasonable inferences"
as to when the photographs were taken, namely, upon the defendant's arrest
for the crime charged or upon his arrest for one of the other armed robberies
about which the jury had heard testimony. As a result, the reference to
"other crimes" did not constitute a reference to inadmissible evidence of
other crimes.
The court did not indicate what "circumstances different from those
presented here, might violate the terms of article 770(2) ..... The
absence of admissible evidence of other crimes might well constitute
33. See LA. R.S. 13:1580 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 756, § 1; and
LA. R.S. 13:1569 (13), (14), (15) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 738, § 1.
34. 325 So. 2d 780 (La. 1975).
35. Id. at 782.
36. Id. at 786.
37. Id.
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sufficiently different circumstances to constitute a reference to other crimes.
The prudent prosecutor would do well to eliminate the term "mug shot"
from his courtroom vocabulary because it serves no legitimate purpose that
cannot be satisfied equally well by the word "photograph," and its potential
for unnecessary prejudice to the defendant may prompt the court in future
cases to declare a mistrial.
MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL
In State v. Smith38 the defendant moved unsuccessfully for a judgment
of acquittal after the prosecution's evidence in a non-jury trial. Thereafter he
offered evidence in defense to a misdemeanor charge of receiving stolen
goods, but, nevertheless, was convicted. On appeal, he contended that the
trial judge should have granted his motion because the prosecution produced
no evidence of an essential element of the crime, i.e. , that he knew or had
good reason to believe that the automobile in question was stolen. The
supreme court affirmed the conviction finding that the missing element in
the proof had been supplied during the defense case by the testimony of the
defendant and two other witnesses.
The defendant urged that denial of the motion for acquittal should be
reviewed on the basis of the prosecution's evidence alone. Rejecting this
contention, the court held that '"on review the appellate court may consider,
in determining whether there is evidence of guilt, not only the evidence
before the court at the time of the motion but the entire admissible evidence
contained in the record of the trial." 39 The court's holding rests not upon
any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but upon an adoption of
the position held by a majority of American jurisdictions and approved by
the ABA Standards.4 Neither article 778 nor any other code provision
specifies the basis for appellate review of a denial of a motion for acquittal.
The majority of states, however, base review upon the entire record
according to a "waiver theory."
The "waiver" rule has been adopted from civil procedure. 4 Making
the motion does not waive the defendant's right to present evidence if the
motion is denied. If the defendant offers evidence after the denial of his
motion, however, he waives the right to have the motion reviewed solely on
the basis of the prosecution's evidence. Thus after denial of his motion the
38. 332 So. 2d 773 (La. 1976).
39. Id. at 776.
40. ABA STANDARDS, TRIAL BY JURY § 4.5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL BY
JURY].
41. Cephus v. United States, 324 F.2d 893, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 37
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defendant faces a dilemma. Should he rest his case without putting on a
defense, thus gambling that the appellate court will reverse the trial court?
Or do the uncertainties of appeal indicate he should use the opportunity to
present a defense? This dilemma has aroused the criticism that the
"waiver" doctrine "unfairly forces the defendant to put on a case. ... 42
The supreme court nevertheless adopted the majority rule, citing the fact
that "the authoritative, scholarly, and balanced American Bar Association
standards have recently reviewed the issue and have reached the considered
recommendation that the merits of the majority view outweigh its
demerits."4
Reliance in this instance upon the ABA Standards seems inapprop-
riate. Article 778 differs significantly from the recommendations of the
ABA Standards regarding the motion for acquittal. 44 Moreover, the
"waiver" theory expressed by Smith differs from that underlying the
majority rule adopted in the ABA Standards. The "waiver" doctrine of the
ABA Standards contemplates that the defense will renew its motion at the
close of all the evidence. 45 Without such a renewal the defendant is not
entitled to obtain review of the motion's denial because he has waived
review by presenting evidence.' Thus the theoretical basis for reviewing all
evidence, not simply that of the prosecution, stems from the fact that the
only motion being reviewed is the one made at the close of all the evidence.
Smith, however, "expressly d[id] not hold,. . and article 778 provides
otherwise. . that a defendant waives his right to have the denial of his
42. 332 So. 2d at 775.
43. Id. at 776.
44. Standard 4.5 of TRIAL BY JURY provides for a judgment of acquittal (directed
verdict), and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in jury cases. Louisiana's 1966
Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for a Judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Article 778 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1975 to
eliminate the directed verdict from jury trials.
45. See TRIAL BY JURY, commentary to § 4.5(a).
46. "A number of cases hold that if the defendant does then introduce evidence,
and does not renew his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the
evidence, the earlier motion can no longer be considered, and the appellate court
cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence except for plain error. If this meant
only that the motion must be made twice, it would be a harmless, if rather pointless,
requirement. It stems, however, from a more important rule. This is that the
introduction of evidence by defendant after his motion has been denied is a waiver of
that motion. Accordingly even if the motion is renewed at the close of all the
evidence, it is only the denial of the later motion that may be claimed as error, and the
conviction will be affirmed, even though the prosecution may have failed to make a
prima facie case, if the evidence for the defense supplied the defect, and the whole
record is sufficient to sustain a conviction." C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 463 (3d ed. 1969) (criminal).
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motion for acquittal reviewed by introducing defense evidence. 4 7 Accord-
ingly, the court reviewed both defense motions for acquittal: the one made
at the close of the prosecution's evidence and the one renewed at the close of
all the evidence. Unlike the majority rule, the Smith "waiver" doctrine
applies only to the question of which evidence, not also which motion, will
be reviewed.
Disregarding such disparities, the court agreed with the "value
adhered to" by the majority rule that:
Despite the potential unfairness of the policy to a defendant, an
erroneous denial of a motion for acquittal is nevertheless not cause for
reversal if the evidence as a whole, including the defendant's case,
justifies the affirmance as guilty (assuming no other reversible error).
To reverse, in such an instance, is to reverse not because the evidence
as a whole does not prove guilt; but because of an erroneous interlocu-
tory ruling which was cured by subsequent evidence. 48
RESPONSIVE VERDICTS
Roberts v. Louisiana49 cited the operation of Louisiana's responsive
verdict system in murder cases as a factor contributing to the unconstitution-
ality of the state's death penalty scheme. The Court's plurality opinion
disapproved the fact that "every jury in a first-degree murder case is
instructed on the crimes of second-degree murder and manslaughter and
permitted to consider those verdicts even if there is not a scintilla of evidence
to support the lesser verdicts. "50
The responsive verdict system, however, was only one factor in the
demise of the death penalty scheme. First of all, the mandatory nature of the
death penalty was a sufficient cause for unconstitutionality. 5 Secondly, it
was the responsive verdict system together with the fact of "no meaningful
appellate review of the jury's decision" that indicated the death penalty
scheme "fail[ed] to comply with Furman's requirement that standardless
jury discretion be replaced by procedures that safeguard against the arbitrary
and capricious imposition of death sentences.' 52
In response to Roberts, the Louisiana legislature enacted a new death
47. 332 So. 2d at 776.
48. Id.
49. 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
50. Id. at 3007 (Emphasis added).
51. See id., citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976).
52. 96 S. Ct. at 3007.
[Vol. 37
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penalty scheme.5 3 Act 657 of 1976 amended the definition of first and
second degree murder. 54 Act 694 of 1976 provided for a separate sentencing
hearing and review by the supreme court of every death sentence to
determine if the death sentence is "excessive." No amendments were
made, however, to the responsive verdict procedure.
55
53. La. Acts 1976, No. 657 amending LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1975); La. Acts
1976, No. 694, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 905-05.9.
54. Formerly, first and second degree murder were defined as follows:
§ 30. First degree murder
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily
harm upon, a fireman or peace officer who was engaged in the performance of
his lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a
life sentence; or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon more than one person; or
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been
offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
§ 30.1 Second degree murder
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(I) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily
harm; or
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpet-
ration of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggra-
vated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to
kill.
Presently, first and second degree murder are defined as follows:
§ 30. First degree murder
First degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a
specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
§ 30.1 Second degree murder
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender is
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape,
aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated es-
cape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill.
55. House Bill No. 1506 (1976) which would have amended article 814 to
eliminate the responsive verdicts to first degree murder, aggravated rape, and
aggravated kidnapping was favorably reported by the House Committee on the
Administration of Criminal Justice but was defeated on the floor of the House of
Representatives.
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The new scheme undoubtedly faces constitutional challenges. The
separate sentencing hearing, because it focuses on the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances of the offense, eliminates the mandatory quality of
the scheme.56 Appellate review of the death sentence for excessiveness
provides a "safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of
death sentences." 5 7 The unamended responsive verdict system remains a
likely basis for attack because the jury in a first degree murder case yet can
return a verdict of second degree murder or manslaughter "even if there is
not a scintilla of evidence to support the lesser verdicts. "58 On the other
hand, a significant constitutional defect in the responsive verdict system
seems to have been eliminated by the separate sentencing hearing; that is to
say, the responsive verdict system no longer "invites the jurors to disregard
their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel the
death penalty is inappropriate." 59
Apart from the constitutional considerations, however, the re-
definitions of first and second degree murder have, it seems to the writer,
actually undermined the rationale of the responsive verdict system. The
former first degree murder statute included the elements of second degree
murder. First degree murder required proof of specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm plus an enumerated felony or other aggravating
circumstance. Second degree murder required proof of either the specific
intent element or an enumerated felony. Thus evidence of specific intent to
kill or to do great bodily harm necessary for first degree murder also proved
one type of second degree murder. As redefined, first degree murder
requires proof of specific intent to kill or to do great bodily harm, but no
longer requires proof of any independent felony or other aggravating
circumstance. Second degree murder under the new definition consists only
of felony murder, i.e., a killing during perpetration or attempted perpetra-
tion of one of several enumerated felonies. Specific intent to kill or to do
great bodily harm is irrelevant to second degree murder. The present
definitions of first and second degree murder, in other words, are mutually
exclusive. Although article 814 of the Code of Criminal Procedure con-
tinues to list second degree murder as a responsive verdict to first degree
murder, it must be recognized that evidence probative of murder in the first
degree no longer actually proves murder in the second degree.
56. Compare Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3006 (1976) with Gregg v.
Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932-41 (1976).
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In the past the Louisiana Supreme Court has refused, for example, in
murder 60 and rape6' cases, to determine whether evidence presented at a
particular trial warranted conviction on a responsive verdict. Nevertheless,
in some cases62 the court has analyzed the rational basis for the legislative
determination that a particular verdict is responsive to another to be whether
the greater offense necessarily includes the elements of the lesser offense. 63
Application of the same analysis to the present first and second degree
murder statutes, the writer respectfully submits, demonstrates the lack of a
rational basis for making second degree murder responsive to first degree
murder.
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
In State v. Gilmore" the supreme court reversed the trial court's
denial of a new trial which had been requested on the basis of newly
discovered evidence. 65" In so doing, the court recognized an expanded
declaration-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule,' thus making
certain newly offered testimony admissible and found that the evidence
"was material and controverted much of the State's evidence upon trial
. . .[and] would probably have changed the verdict of the jury. "67 The
court also discussed the statute's requirement that failure to discover the
60. State v. West, 319 So. 2d 901,905-06 (La. 1975); State v. Peterson, 290 So. 2d
307, 311 (La. 1974); State v. Cooley, 260 La. 768, 770-73, 257 So. 2d 400, 401-02
(1972).
61. State v. Miller, 237 La. 266, 111 So. 2d 108 (1959).
62. See State v. Peterson, 290 So. 2d 307 (La. 1974); State v. Miller, 237 La. 266,
111 So. 2d 108 (1959).
63. See 290 So. 2d at 309-10.
64. 332 So. 2d 789 (La. 1976). The writer wishes to acknowledge that he
represented the state during some of the post-trial proceedings in this case, although
he did not act as trial counsel for the state. Thus, his views may be influenced by
considerations outside the written record.
65. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851 provides in part:
The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever:
(3) New and material evidence that, notwithstanding the exercise of
reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before or during the
trial, is available, and if the evidence had been introduced at trial it would.
probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty;
66. "Therefore, we hold, under these circumstances, the statements which
clearly were against Sparks' penal interest would be admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule." 332 So. 2d at 792.
67. Id. at 793-94.
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evidence prior to or during trial not have resulted from a lack of "reasonable
diligence."
The defendant was charged with second degree murder68 and con-
victed of manslaughter for a killing which occurred outside a barroom. The
state produced evidence that the defendant and a companion approached a
group of people, that the companion became embroiled in an argument with
a third person, and that the companion produced a gun over which he and the
third party struggled. The state witnesses testified that the defendant
produced a second gun with which he shot and killed the third party. The
defense claimed that the companion committed the killing. One defense
witness testified that the companion, who had since died, confessed to him
that he did the killing.
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the defense produced three
witnesses directly contradicting the state's evidence. Two of them testified
that one of the state's eyewitnesses to the crime had not in fact been present
at the scene of the crime. The same witnesses also testified that neither saw
the defendant in the vicinity of the barroom on the night of the crime.
Finally, a third witness testified that the dead companion had, on the day
following the killing, admitted to the actual shooting.
Of particular interest is the court's statement concerning "reasonable
diligence."
Had the defendant been represented by retained counsel perhaps
we would expect the kind of diligent investigation for evidence which
would have resulted in the earlier tracking down of these witnesses.
However, the defendant here, who was incarcerated from the time of
his arrest until trial, was provided a defense by court appointed counsel
through the Orleans Indigent Defender Program. In light of its limited
resources we are not prepared to say that it failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in this case. However, even if it did, the defendant, as an
indigent, should not be made to suffer because of a possible shortcom-
ing of counsel provided by the court. "69
The court's treatment of the "reasonable diligence" requirement is
subject to two possible interpretations. Standing alone, the statement that
"the defendant, as an indigent, should not be made to suffer because of a
possible shortcoming of counsel provided by the court" might indicate that
the court considers the "reasonable diligence" requirement irrelevant in
68. The original indictment for the first degree murder was amended to second
degree murder by the state approximately four months prior to trial.
69. 332 So. 2d at 793 (Emphasis added).
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cases involving indigents. On the other hand, the court seems to have been
faced with a "hard case," requiring reversal "in the interest of fairness and
justice.' ,70
The "reasonable diligence" requirement reflects. the principle that
"[ain application for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
should be viewed with extreme caution.' '71 To ignore the requirement
generally in the case of indigents would lessen the incentive in some cases to
do the necessary pre-trial investigation. The indigent who is unquestionably
guilty might benefit by withholding investigative leads from his court-
appointed counsel in order to insure the production of "new and material
evidence" after a possible conviction.
The writer respectfully submits that, read in the context of its unusual
facts, Gilmore does not stand for a general elimination of the "reasonable
diligence" requirement in the case of indigents. Gilmore involves an
eyewitness to the killing and two other witnesses from the vicinity of the
crime who did not testify at trial, but who contradicted the state's witnesses
on the only issue in the case, identity of the killer. Not surprisingly, the
supreme court disagrees with the trial court's conclusion that the new
evidence "would not have altered the jury's verdict." 72 The court's
disregard of the "reasonable diligence" requirement, it is submitted,
simply reflects its willingness in some few compelling cases to "review the
exercise of discretion in the trial judge's refusal to grant a new trial where
the 'ends of justice will be served' as an error of law. 73
70. Id. at 794.
71. State v. Jefferson, 305 So. 2d 465, 468 (La. 1974).
72. 332 So. 2d at 793.
73. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court for the 1972-1973 Term-
Criminal Procedure 11, 34 LA. L. REV. 427, 435 (1974).
